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I. Problem and Interaction Conditions
We shall propose a set of propositions describing the relation be­
tween specific and defined self-other expectations and the resolution of 
disagreements in a two man group.
We take as given a two man group with members A and B. Each member 
of the group holds a performance expectation for himself and his partner 
with respect to a ?pedi'fic task. Each expectation admits of only one of 
two values ־־ highj + j or low j - j . Thus a completely specified expecta
—  — ־ - ״ ~ ׳ '
tion structure might be one in which A holds high expectations as to 
what he can do -- anticipates that his performance on a given task will 
be of a high or superior quality, and holds low expectations as to what 
B can do —  anticipates that his performance on the given task will be 
of a low or inferior quality. At the same time B holds low expectations 
as to what he can do and high expectations as to what A can do.
A variety of concrete interpretations for the values | + j and j -1 
assigned to performance expectations are at this point admissible. Thus 
in the example given, A might be an individual who with respect to a spe 
cific task regards himself as the one who is likely to come up with the 
"best ideas,” or highly creative solutions and his partner as the one
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who is likely to come up with "poor" or "inferior ideas, while B's expec­
tations for himself and A are in agreement with those that A holds for A 
and B.
Given that each performance expectation has two referents —  self
and other, and that each can take on only one of the two values -- high
| + ¡and low j - j, we distinguish the following four basic types:
Type I. The case in which the individual has high expectations for 
self and low expectations for his partner + ” ¡5
Type II. The case in which the individual has low. expectations for 
self and high expectations for partner i ־+,;. J
Type III. The case in which the individual has high expectations for 
both self and his partner j++!; and
w -J
Type IV. The case in which the individual holds low expectations as to 
what he and his partner can do with respect to a specific 
task | —  I.
'■h; no” '־ ~
We now consider the situation where the members of a two man group 
are addressed to the solution of a typical evaluation problem used in 
small groups research, for example, a human relations problem. At the 
outset of their activities, each holds one of the four expectation pat­
terns listed above and it is relevant to their task. That is, these ex­
pectations as to what each and his partner can do are precisely appli­
cable to the problem at hand. For our purposes their task consists of 
a series of discrete decision stages. At each stage each subject has to 
decide between two alternatives —  different opinions, suggestions, or 
predictions concerning the problem. Each subject independently makes a 
preliminary decision from among the alternatives given to him. Informa­
tion about preliminary decisions is then exchanged (via the experimenter), 
and subjects are then permitted to make their final decisions. Informa­
tion about final decisions is not exchanged. The group's solution of 
the task consists of the final decisions the subjects have made over the
entire process. The subjects are motivated to make the "best possible 
group solution," and are informed that the group's solution, which is 
the sum of their separate final decisions, can and is to be evaluated as 
to its quality. Finally at each decision stage, the members of the 
group are led to believe (via feigned information from the experimenter) 
that their partner's preliminary choice differs from their own. Conse­
quently at each stage in the process, each subject is required to re­
solve a disagreement between himself and his partner.
We can now state more explicitly our problem: given a two man 
group with an initially defined expectation structure, and a decision 
making process such as characterized above, what predictions can we make 
concerning the relation between initial expectation structure and the 
pattern of disagreement resolutions?
We shall tackle the problem of describing the relations between 
specific self-other expectation patterns, which an individual holds, and 
the final resolutions he makes by considering what is involved in each 
of our four basic cases.
Before turning to this problem, it is important to summarize the 
characteristics of the task conditions given here: (1) The subjects are 
confronted with a problem which they are asked to solve as a two man 
team. (2) The "team's" solution consists of the total set of final deci­
sions each man has made over the decision-making process. Each man's 
final decision at each stage constitutes one unit in this total set.
(3) The subjects believe that the team's solution, i.e., the total set 
of final decisions, can and is to be evaluated as to its quality -- 
for example, in terms of the total number of "correct" or "good" final 
decisions made by both individuals over the decision making process.
(4) The subjects are motivated to achieve the best possible team solu­
tion ־־ for example, the highest total number of correct or good unit de­
cisions. (5) There are no objective standards in terms of which a sub­
ject can actually evaluate, in a clear-cut and unambiguous manner, each 
decision. (6) There is the presence of disagreements between the mem­
bers of the team at each stage in the process, and the necessity for re­
solving disagreements at each stage. (7) There is no feedback to the 
subjects as to how, in fact, disagreements have been resolved at each 
stage. The theory to be presented here is applicable to an "interaction'1 
process for which these conditions hold.
II• Constructing a Set of Assumptions
Having set the conditions of this problem solving task, what predic­
tions can we make concerning the relations of specific self-other expec­
tation patterns and the final resolutions subjects will make?
Given the type of task the subject faces, where he must accept the 
initial ideas of one person and reject those of the second, we assume 
that he will come to attach differential valuations to these ideas.
Forced to make this choice between his own act and the act of the other, 
he will come to "perceive" one suggestion as "good," "correct" and the 
other as "bad,1" "incorrect," or one proposal as representing a better deci­
sion than the second.^- Once the subject has arrived at this differential 
evaluation of the two acts at a given step in the process, he will then 
choose between these acts on the basis of the relative valuation he has 
attached to them, i.e., the act which he comes to value more highly he 
will accept as the basis of his final decision while rejecting the less
 ^ The implication here is that the need to resolve disagreements, of 
the type considered, is one of the principal conditions which leads to 
the differential evaluation of performances by an individual.
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highly valued act. Now given the absence of "objective standards" in this 
task situation, we assume that the standard which the subject uses, to 
attach differential valuations to acts at a particular stage, is given 
by the expectations he holds for self and other at that stage. Conse­
quently, the valuations which an individual attaches to the act of self 
and other will tend to agree with the values he assigns to his expecta­
tions for self and other. For example, if an individual holds high expec­
tations for self and low expectations for other, at a particular stage in 
the decision making process, we would in general expect him to attach a 
relatively high valuation to the act of self and a low valuation to the 
act of other at that stage. Having attached these valuations to the two 
acts, the subject would then resolve the disagreement at this point by 
accepting the act of self and rejecting the act of other. Further, we 
assume that if such a resolution sequence occurs, it will serve to main­
tain the expectations which the individual holds. That is to say, if the 
subject's evaluation of acts at a given stage coincides with his evalua­
tion of expectations at that stage, the pattern of expectations that he 
holds will continue, unchanged, to the next stage.^
We shall formulate in a more rigorous manner the assumptions we have 
been developing here. The first of our assumptions applies to each of the 
four types of expectation patterns we consider.
Assumption 1. The subject will accept that act on the nth decision stage 
to which he attaches a high valuation, and reject that act 
to which he attaches a low valuation on this stage.
1 . It is clear that the argument employed here', I.e., that' !^"'evaluations 
of unit acts coincide with the expectation structure the individual holds 
for self and other the expectation structure will be maintained, is in ac­
cord with F. Heider's basic propositions concerning the maintenance of 
balanced interpersonal states. In Heiderian terms the subject, in this 
situation, holds a general positive evaluation of self and a negative 
evaluation of other. The subject associates himself with an act (selects 
a choice) which he positively evaluates and finds his partner associating 
himself with an act which the subject negatively evaluates. In terms of 
the theory of structural balance, this situation represents a balanced 
state and will tend to be maintained, see (3; 4, espec. Chap. 7).
The term act is interpreted to refer to "idea, 11 "proposal," suggestion״ 
which is made by the subject and his compatriot with respect to a deci­
sion unit in the decision making process. Assumption 1 simply make expli­
cit the assertion that the individual will accept, as his final decision, 
that act to which he attributes the highest valuation at a given stage.
A. The Type I Expectation Pattern. Our next two assumptions are 
developed for the Type I expectation case. This is the situation in 
which the individual holds high expectations for self and low for his
partner . The task situation with which the individual is confron-
ted requires that he resolve a disagreement between himself and his part­
ner at each stage. This we have assumed will lead him to make a differ­
ential evaluation between his own idea or proposal and that of his part­
ner, and his expectation pattern will provide the basis for this evaluation. 
In the Type I case the subject's expectation structure does provide him 
with a basis for making differential evaluations as between his own act 
and the act of his partner. Since he holds high expectations for self 
and low for his partner, we in general expect him to attach a high valua­
tion to his own act and a low valuation to that of his partner. We let 0 
represent the probability that this subject attaches a high valuation to 
his own act (while attaching a low valuation to that of his partner) on any 
stage in the decision making process on which he holds a Type I pattern. 
Then 1-0 represents the probability that this subject will attach a high 
valuation to the idea of his partner (while attaching a low valuation to 
his own idea) at that stage. These ideas are embodied in our next assumption.
Assumption 2. If a subject holds high expectations for self and low for 
other L+-j at decision stage n, he will attach on this 
stage a high valuation to his own act with probability 0 
or a high valuation to the act of his partner with prob-
We have already reasoned that if the subject's valuation of his own 
and his partner's acts, at any stage, coincides with the valuation he
ability 1 -0 .
attaches to his expectations for self and other, his expectation struc­
ture will be maintained into the subsequent stage. In the Type I case 
we expect that the value of 0 will be greater than the value of 1 -0 .
Thus in general we would expect that in this situation the resolution 
sequence which takes place is one which will lead to a maintenance of 
the individual's expectation structure. However, the possibility does 
exist that a subject with a Type I pattern does on a given stage attach 
a high valuation to the act of his partner (while attaching a low valu­
ation to his own act). If this resolution sequence occurs, we reason 
that the subject with a Type I expectation structure is more likely to 
"entertairf1the idea that his partner may be as good as he is than to 
entertain the conception that he is as bad as his partner is on this 
type of task. Thus as a consequence of this resolution sequence, we 
assume that the possibility exists that the expectation structure for 
this subject will change from Type I to Type III -- that is to one in 
which he holds high expectations for self and other. We let r repre­
sent the probability that the subject with a Type I pattern on the nth 
stage who makes a decision in favor of his partner comes to hold a Type 
III pattern on the n+1 stage. Then 1-r represents the probability that 
this subject's pattern remains the same on the next stage. These ideas 
are embodied in the following assumption:
Assumption 3: If a subject who holds high expectations for self and low 
for other r+-l , attaches a high valuation to his own act 
on the nth decision stage, his expectations remain un­
changed at the n + 1 stage. If this subject attaches a 
high valuation to the act of his partner, his expecta­
tions change to that of high for self and other £4+3 with 
probability r or remain unchanged with probability 1 -r, 
in moving to the n + 1 stage.
B. The Type II Expectation Pattern. We next consider the case of 
the subject with a Type II expectation structure [־+) who is confronted 
with this decision making task. Reasoning in a manner similar to that
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in the Type I case, we argue that because the subject in this situation 
is required, at each step in the task, to resolve a disagreement which 
entails accepting the act of one (self or his partner) and rejecting 
the act of other, he will assign differing values to the two acts. The 
basis for the assignment of these values is given by the expectation 
structure he holds on the given decision stage. As in the previous 
case, the fact that the subject with a Type II pattern holds differen­
tial expectations for self as compared with ether provides him with a 
basis for attaching differential values to the acts of self and other at 
a given stage; and that the differential values he attaches to these 
acts will, in general, tend to coincide with the differential expecta­
tions he holds. We let y  represent the probability that this subject 
attaches a high valuation to his own act (with a low valuation being 
attached to the act of his partner) on any specific decision making 
stage on which he holds a Type II pattern. Then l-y׳; represents the 
probability that he will attach a high valuation to the idea of his 
partner (with a low valuation being attached to his own idea) on that 
stage. These ideas are stated in the following assumption:
Assumption 4. If a subject holds low expectations for self and high for 
other [ “+ J  at decision stage n, he will attach■* on this 
stage, a high valuation to his own act with probability 
UV , or a high valuation to the act of his partner with 
probability 1 ־ y  •
In general we expect that the value of 1 - ^  will be greater than 
the value of ^  » an<* that if the subject's evaluation of acts on a par­
ticular stage does coincide with his expectations for self and other at 
that stage, then his expectation structure continues unchanged into the 
subsequent stage. But again the possibility exists, although it may be
a relatively small one, that a subject with a Type II pattern |-+Jon a 
given stage, comes to attach a high valuation to his own act and a low 
valuation to the act of his partner at that stage. We reason that if 
this resolution sequence should occur, the subject holding low expectations 
for self and high for other is likely to "entertain" the conception 
that his partner is no better than he is on this type of task.*
Thus we assume that given this type of resolution sequence the possibil­
ity exists that the expectation structure for this individual will change 
from Type II to Type IV —  to one in which the individual holds low 
expectations for self and other. We let d represent the probability 
that a subject who holds a Type II pattern and attaches a high valuation 
to his own act on a given stage comes to hold a Type IV pattern on the 
subsequent stage. Then 1-d represents the probability that this sub­
ject's expectations do not change in moving to the next stage of the 
process. These assertions are stated in Assumption 5.
Assumption 5. If a subject holding low expectations for self and high 
for other f ־+ l  , attaches a high valuation to the act of 
his partner of! the nth decision stage, his expectations 
remain unchanged at the n + 1 stage. If this subject 
attaches a high valuation to his own act, his expecta­
tions change to that of low for self and other £— J with 
probability d or remain unchanged with probability l־d, 
in moving to the n + 1 stage.
1. It is of interest to compare this situation with one in which a 
subject with a Type II pattern [j־+ J finds himself in agreement with 
other. If the subject is in agreement with other, we would assume that 
he may conceive of himself as being "as good as his partner" on the 
problem, and therefore be capable of moving to a [++J pattern. In this 
case, the valuation of the subject's act is validated by its agreement 
with an individual for whom he holds high expectations. In the situa­
tion we are considering above, the subject rejects the act of the indi­
vidual for whom he holds high expectations. Thus, we argue, this sub­
ject is likely to entertain the idea that his partner is "no better 
than himself" and is capable of moving to a £--"] pattern.
IC. The Type III Expectation Pattern. This is the case in which 
an individual holds high expectations for self and other |++j• Unlike 
the individual with a Type I or Type II structure, in this situation 
the subject does not have a differentiated expectation structure which 
can provide a basis for assigning different values to the acts of self 
and other. In spite of this fact, his task is such that he must accept 
and reject acts at each stage and thus, we reason, he is led to attach 
differential values to these acts at each stage. We assume that where 
a subject does not have a differentiated expectation pattern, which pro­
vides the basis for a more or less likely assignment of values to acts, 
he will attach a high valuation to one act (while attaching a low valu­
ation to the second) in a random manner. This idea is presented in As­
sumption 6 , which is applicable to the case in which the subject holds 
either a Type IV pattern j--j or a Type III pattern |++j•
Assumption 6 . If a subject holds high expectations for self and other 
f++i or low expectations for self and other (--] at the 
nth decision stage, he will randomly attach either a 
high valuation to his own act or a high valuation to his 
partner's act on the nth stage.
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Since the expectation pattern of a subject holding a Type III 
structure is not differentiated, his differential evaluations of acts 
will not coincide with the expectations he holds for self and other. 
Consequently, this subject is assumed to be in an unstable situation.*
1. In terms of Heider's theory the situation we are describing here 
represents an imbalanced state. The subject holds a general positive 
evaluation of self and other; associates himself with an act for which 
he has a positive evaluation and finds his partner selecting a choice 
which the subject negatively evaluates. According to Heider, if an im­
balanced state exists , then forces will arise to change this state, 
"either through action..(m the part of the subjec^i.or through cogni­
tive reorganization." If change is not possible, "the state of imbalance 
will produce tension" ( 3 ). A similar conception has been developed 
by Festinger as part of his theory of cognitive dissonance ( 2 ).
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Since he is forced to assign different values to acts at each stage, it 
is assumed that these valuations will "impinge" on his undifferentiated 
structure, and that a tendency will exist, at each stage, to change the 
subject's undifferentiated structure to a differentiated one. In this 
situation, where the subject holds high expectations for self and other 
and he is forced at each stage to assign high or low values to the acts 
of self in comparison to the acts of other, we assume that he is more 
likely to change his high expectations for other to low expectations for 
other than he is to change his high self expectations to low self ex­
pectations. In particular, we expect this change to be likely to occur 
at each stage in which a subject actually does assign a high value to 
his own act and a low value to the act of other, otherwise his expecta­
tion structure will remain unchanged. These considerations are given 
in Assumption 7. In this assumption we let p represent the probability
that the subject holding high expectations for self and other on
the nth stage, comes to hold high expectations for self and low for
that this subject's expectation pattern is unchanged in moving to the 
n + 1 stage.
Assumption 7. If a subject holds high expectations for self and other
f־H ־*| at the nth decision stage, and attaches a high valu­
ation to his own act on this stage, his expectations 
change to high for self and low for other Qf- 1 with 
probability p, or remain unchanged with probability 1 -p 
in moving to the n + 1 stage. If this subject attahces 
a high valuation to the act of his partner on this stage, 
his expectations remain unchanged in moving to the n + 1
other j +-| on the rH־l stage, and we let 1 -p represent the probability
stage.
D. The Type IV Expectation Pattern. The final case we consider 
is one in which the subject holds low expectations for self and for
other J-- . As in the case of the subject who holds a Type III pattern, 
the expectation structure of this subject is undifferentiated and we as­
sume, assplying Assumption 6, that as long as this subject holds to this 
structure he will randomly assign high (and concomitantly low) values 
to the acts of self and other. As in the previous case, since the sub­
ject's differential valuations of acts at each stage in the process can­
not coincide with the values he assigns to self and other expectations, 
we assume that the subject is in an unstable situation. Once again we 
reason that the differential valuations of acts, which this subject is 
forced to make at each stage, in order to resolve disagreements, im­
pinges upon his expectation structure. Consequently, there is a ten­
dency at each stage to change his undifferentiated expectation struc­
ture to a differentiated one. What kind of change is to be expected in 
this situation? We reason as follows: if this subject were to move in 
the direction of changing his self-expectations from low to high (with­
out changing those for other) he would be moving into a position from 
which he would have to assume a major share of personal responsibility 
for the quality of the team's solution. Movement in this direction can 
be expected to induce anxiety in this subject, over and above that 
which it is reasonable to believe he already has by virtue of his ini­
tially low self-expectations. We assume that in this situation the 
subject will move in a direction which will decrease his initial anxi­
ety rather than increase it, and that he will act in an "ego defensive" 
manner. Consequently, we expect this subject to be likely to change 
his low expectations for other to high expectations rather than to 
change his own self-expectations. Therefore we assert that, if on a 
given decision stage this subject actually does attach a high value to
the idea of other (while attaching a low value to his own idea), the 
possibility exists that this subject's pattern will change from |j--J to 
j־+ j in moving to the next stage; otherwise this subject's pattern will 
remain unchanged. The reasoning developed here is embodied in Assump­
tion 8, in which q represents the probability that a subject with a jj־-J 
pattern on the nth decision stage comes to hold a J־+J pattern on the 
next stage, and l־q represents the probability that this subject's pat­
tern does not change.
Assumption 8. If a subject holds low expectations for self and other
£-3־ at the nth decision stage, and attaches a high val­
uation to the act of his partner at this stage, his ex­
pectations change to low for self and high for other 
[־+j with probability q, or remain unchanged, with prob­
ability l־q, in moving to the n + 1 stage. If this sub­
ject attaches a high valuation to his own act on this 
stage, his expectations remain unchanged in moving to 
the n + 1 stage.
Our task is now completed. Assumptions 1 to 8 as a set, constitute 
a simple theory for self-other expectation patterns in the two man group. 
In particular, they describe the effect of the expectation pattern, which 
an individual holds, on the manner in which he will resolve a disagree­
ment between self and other, and in turn the effect of these resolutions 
upon his expectation pattern. At this stage, the theory is formulated 
to apply to the particular type of intereaction situation we have de­
scribed, and no greater generality with respect to task situation and 
interaction process is assumed.
III. Some Mathematical Properties of the Theory
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In this section we shall formulate this theory so as to be able 
to use it in a precise manner to predict relations between the expecta-
tions which an individual holds and the resolutions he will make. Tbdo 
this we shall first examine the structure of the action process we have 
constructed in developing this theory. To begin with, a subject on any
which, given the assumed task conditions, leads him to assign either a 
high value to his own unit act and a low value to the unit act of his 
partner (+-) or the reverse (־+). On the basis of this differential 
evaluation of unit acts he resolves the initial disagreement either in 
favor of self (S) or other (0), and in turn moves to one of the basic 
expectation patterns on the n + 1 step. The structure of the action 
process we have formulated is represented diagramtically in Figure 1
for the case in which a subject holds a j+-| pattern on trial n.
A similar representation can be given for subjects holding each of
trial n is seen to hold one of the basic
On each trial he is confronted with a disagreement (D)
the other patterns on trial n.
Figure 1
Structure of Action Process 
t ô t Subject Holding [ + - J pattéEft on Trial n
Unit Evaluation Expectation PatternExpectation Pattern 
on Trial n on Trial n + 1of Acts
S <
D
0>־+(
*־•il׳ v:Response
Experimentally Determined 
Disagreement
In formalizing our theory we take as our basic unit of analysis 
the four types of expectation patterns an individual can hold, and the 
two types of resolution behavior in which he can engage, i.e., accept­
ing the act of self, S (while rejecting that of other) Or accepting the 
act of other, 0 (while rejecting that of self).
As the experiment proceeds the subject makes a sequence of respon­
ses S or 0 and moves through the basic expectation patterns, |-H-j >|+” i» 
j-+j» j— |• We shall assume that movement through the expectation pat­
terns can be described by means of a Markov chain whose states are the 
four expectation patterns. To specify this chain we must specify the 
transition probabilities •» that is, the probability that the sub­
ject moves to state j on the next step when he is in state i. We com­
pute these probabilities by making use of our assumptions A1-A3. For 
each expectation state the possibilities and probabilities for his next 
response and expectation state are given by the tree diagram in Figure 2.
From the tree diagrams in Figure 2 we can easily find the desired 
transition matrix, P, for the expectation process.
Tree Diagrams for 
Expectation Transitions
Expectation state 
at trial n + 1Response
Expectation 
state at 
trial
\| 
I ++
L־f]
: ־ ־[
1. For purposes of simplifying these diagrams certain features of the 
action process have been omitted: (a) the representation of a disagree­
ment (D) which by stipulated task condition is taken to occur on each 
trial, (b) the representation of a differential unit evaluation of acts 
(+-) and (-+) which by Assumption 1 (Page 5) are assumed to stand respec­
tively in a one to one correspondence with self and other responses, see 
Figure 1.
Matrix of One-Step Transition 
Probabilities for the Expectation Process
n+1
N [+{l C 3 ״
l ־ ( l / 2 ) p ( 1 / 2 ) P 0 0
r(l-0) (1 -r) + r0 0 0
0 0 l־d y d y
0 0 d / 2 ) q l ־ d / 2 ) q
H  /  H  
: H  H \
We shall refer to this Markov chain as the expectation process.
Of course we do not observe the expectation patterns during the course 
of the decision making process but rather the responses. hence we are 
also interested in a process which describes these responses. We obtain 
such a process in the following manner. We first form a Markov chain 
in which the states are j -H-S j, j +-:-0 j, j+-S|, £ + 0 ־ J, j־+Sj, j—t0־j, |^ --S j, 
| - - 0  J. These represent the expectation pattern and the responses made 
by the subject on a trial. For example, he is in state (j־+sj when he 
is in the expectation state and attaches a high evaluation to his
own act. We shall call this process the total process. The transition 
matrix can again be computed from the tree diagram of figure 2. This 
transition matrix, P, for the total process is given below. Note that 
we are using the assumption that the response of a subject depends only 
on the expectation pattern that he holds and not on his previous re­
sponse.
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Matrix* of One-Step Transition Probabilities 
for Total Process
(8)
H
(7)(6)(5)
-+S
n+1
(4 )
+-01
(3)
l + - s !
(2)( 1)
j  ^ ׳ % ( l ־ p ) M 1 ־ p ) P 0 p ( l - 0 ) 0 0 0 0
1 *
0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
1 - 0 0 0 0 0
\ r ( l - r ) 0 ( l ־ r ) ( 1 - 0 ) 0 0 0 0
° ו
0 0 0 ( 1 - d ) y ( l - d ) O - y ) % d ^ d
«
0 0 0
V
1 - y / 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 h h
0 ן \ 0 0 0 q  'Ÿ q ( l ־ f )  | * ־ < l ־ q ) % ( l ־ q ) .
From the total process we obtain the response process by combining cer- 
tain states into a single state. That is, for states |־H ‘S |> , £־+s j >
|--S|, we record a single state S. Similarly, for the states |++0J י j-H-0J, 
­ ­ו , we record a single state 0 .
1. Matrix P in fact can be partitioned into four sub-matrices: a 
matrix Q whose entries represent the one-step probabilities of moving 
from and to states (1) through (4); a matrix R whose entries represent 
the one-step probabilities of moving from and to states (5) through 
(8); and two matrices D and Z whose entries, respectively, represent 
the one-step probabilities of moving from states (1) through (4) to 
states (5) through (8), and (5) through (8) to (1) through (4). In 
the present theoretical formulation of the total process, matrices D 
and Z are 0 matrices. Consequently, matrices Q and R can be used in 
lieu of P in describing properties of the total process. This same 
partitioning occurs in the expectation transition matrix.
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The response process is not in general a Markov chain. That is, it 
is not true that: the probability of a subject making an S or 0 response 
on the n + 1 trial depends only on the response he made on the nth trial 
and does not depend on his previous sequence of responses.* This may be 
seen, for example, by computing the probabilities of a subject making a 
particular response given different previous response histories.
To illustrate this, let us consider a subject who starts out initi­
ally in a j + + 1 expectation state. LetR״ represent the response he makes 
on the nth decision unit. is equal to either S or 0. What is the 
probability, for example, that his response on the third state is S, given 
that he made an S response both on the second and on the first decision 
unit? We can compute this probability from our tree diagrams properly ex­
tended to describe the first three decision stages.
f i 1  Pr| R_ = S A  R׳> = S A  R, = S IPr R3 = Sjr2 *= S ^ R l = S = L  3 _ 2 1 J
Pr ^  ־ S A  Rl - S~j
4p02 + 2p0(l-p) + (1-p) 2 
4pjtf + 2(l-p)
We can now compare this with the probability that this subject will make 
an S response on the third stage given that he made an S response on the 
second and an 0 response on the initial stage.
Pr|R3 ־ S|R2 ־ S /\ Rl ־ ~|0 ־  H _R3 S A  r 2 = S A  R! " °J
Pr| R2 ־ S A  Rx 0 ־j  
* p0 + %(l-p)
1. For a discussion of the assumptions of a Markov chain;-,, see Kemeny 
and Snell ( 5 ).
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The fact that these probabilities differ means that if one were to consi­
der the subject's responses alone, we would, in general, expect to find 
that they do depend on his history of past responses.*" That, by virtue 
of our assumptions, this is expected to be the case, appears to be an in­
tuitively desirable property of this formulation.
This result (i.e., that the observable response process is not expec­
ted to be a Markov chain) points to the fact that expectation patterns 
and the behavior of these patterns, as described in our assumptions, oper­
ate on the level of an inferential process in this theory.
Finally, it is to be observed that if we combine states in the total 
process by combining states with the same expectation pattern, we obtain 
the expectation process which is a Markov chain.
IV. Uses and Development of the Formal Model
By virtue of the fact that the expectation process and the total pro­
cess are Markov chains, we can use the results of this stochastic model
2to derive substantively meaningful consequences from our assumptions.
We shall illustrate this by considering one of the quantities, that can 
be formally derived, which is of particular importance in testing and fur­
ther developing this theory. This quantity is the predicted sequence of 
observable responses.
Let P be the transition matrix for the expectation process. Then 
the entries of the matrix P raised to the nth power, P״ , have a simple
1. This does not overlook the fact that for special cases, i.e., particu­
lar values of our parameters, the subject's responses may be independent 
of his history of responses.
2. For a detailed discussion of the types of quantities which can be ob­
tained from this type of stochastic model, see (5).
probabilistic interpretation. The entry is the probability that the
chain which started in state i will be in state j at time n. Let us as­
sume that we start in state ¡•H-j or J^ +^ j so that we can restrict out at= 
tention to the transition matrix
j-H-j +-
|V |  / l-(l/2)p (l/2)p |
|+־ | \ r(l-0) (1-r) + r(¡)j
P =
The nth power of this matrix is
1E U _ \-i
r ( 1 -0 )
Jàh-.Sà le.%p r(l-0) + ^ p \  : r(l0־) +^p r ( 1 -0 ) + %p '
+ ( l -  r(l-0) - ( h ) p ) n j
־r a - 0)
' r(l-0) + %p r(l-0 )+ h p /
/r(l-0 ) +
L _  ___ Ù 1 2___1\r ( 1 -0 ) + %p r(l-0)+ %py
The factor ^1 - r(l-9) - %p^ ) ״ which multiplies the second matrix is 
less than one in absolute value and hence as n increases this matrix tends 
to the 0 matrix. This means that the probability of being in each of the 
expectation states approach a limiting value given by the first matrix. 
The fact that the rows of this matrix are the same means that this limit­
ing probability of being in each of the states does not depend on the 
starting state. These results are typical for this type of Markov chain.
We can also obtain the probabilities for an S response on each trial. 
When the expectation process is in state j++| the probability of an S
~  ~  « (n> response is 1/2. When it is in state I+- it is 0. Let p be the* - ־H ־ y s
probability of an S response after the nth state of the expectation
־22־
process.^ Then
(1) = (l/2)p(n^  + 0 p(n^
++,s ++,++ ++,+*
_l/2(r(l-0 ) + pjQ , \n /  %p(%-g) \  
r(l-0) + %p + ^ 1  - r(l2 ־ (0־ p) (^r(l«0 )+%p i
(2) p (n) = (l/2)p(n) + 0 P(n)
+ ־»s +-,++ +-,+-
^  + ( 1  - r(i0־) - *>)“%p v X  \  r(l-0) + kv y
l/2 (r(l-fl) + %P) 
r(l0־) +
Again we see that the second terns tend toward 0 (zero) and we have 
a limiting probability for an S response which is independent of the 
starting expectation pattern.
To illustrate these response probabilities let us take 0 = .9; i  
2p = .4, and r = .5. Then from (1) and (2) we obtain theoretically pre­
dicted curves for the observable responses for the cases in which the 
subject starts in expectation pattern |++j and pattern |+־|• These 
curves are shown in figure 3. Note that after about 15 trials the prob­
abilities for responses remain constant. We say that the process has 
reached equilibrium at this time.
1. By experimental manipulation the investigator^knows which.expecta­
tion state the subject is initially in: jVi-J , j+ "|» j> or ( "־J*
2. It is to be observed that if r = 0, the expectation process reduces 
to an absorbing chain for subjects starting with either a £־H  j or p —3 
state. Similarly, if d = 0, this process reduces itself to an absorbing 
chain for subjects starting from a !־־־j or f-+j state. See Matrix of 
One $tep Transformation Probabilities for the Expectation Process, p.
17. . ...... . ... ......   ' ‘' “
Figure 4 
Predicted Response Process
In general, these theoretically predicted response curves will de-
* tf
pend upon the subject's initial state and the values of the parameters 
for the specific experimental situation.
More detailed information concerning the response process is needed 
for estimation and testing. This information is most easily obtained 
from the total process using the fact that the response process may be 
obtained from this process by combining states. Quantities which may be 
computed using standard Markov chain methods include (a) the probability 
of obtaining a specific response sequence, (b) the mean and variance 
for length of runs of a particular type of response, (c) the mean and 
variance for the number of times the subject makes a particular type of 
response given that he started off in a specified expectation state, and
(d) the mean and variance of the number of times the subject moved from 
one response to a second. Such derived quantities enable us to describe, 
in a highly precise manner, the various aspects and features of the re­
sponse predicted from this theory. For a particular experimental situa­
tion the relevant parameters of the model (0 , p, and r, if the subject 
is initially in one of the expectation states j -H- j, j+־|» an<* > Q» ’ 
and d, if he is initially in one of the state j־+j> | ־־־ j) can be estima­
ted from a subset of these derived quantities (for example, using maxi­
mum likelihood methods we can estimate them from (a) alone). The model 
itself can then be tested against the remaining quantities which can be 
formally derived for this process described by our assumption.
It is clear that in its present form the theory, which we have pre­
sented, includes a number of simplifying assumptions, and that any deci­
sion as to the utility of this theory, as a basis for further elabora­
tion, must await the results of extensive experimental study.* The 
development of a rigorous theory to describe the effects of expectations 
on the interaction process of individuals has long been a problem of in­
terest in our field. It is to be hope¿ that this theory and model may 
stimulate a new set of theoretical and experimental approaches to this 
problem.
-24-
1. Research is presently under way to develop an experimental situation 
which meets the conditions we have stipulated for this action process 
and which, it is anticipated, will provide the type of test data re­
quired by our conceptualization.
s.
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